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Abstract
The so-called “ﬁscal policy approach" predicts that increases in income skewness
should be associated with an intensiﬁcation of redistributive eﬀorts, at least in
democracies. If redistribution is detrimental to growth, then this implies that a
poor middle class is bad for long-run productivity; a prediction which has found
empirical support. However, cross-country studies tend to ﬁnd a negative associa-
tion between income skewness and the amount of redistribution taking place, and,
a positive relationship between redistributive taxation and growth. This paper of-
fers a reconciliation of the existing theory and these puzzling ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally,
the model predicts that the traditionally stipulated chains of causality holds within
countries, whereas the puzzling correlations mentioned above may arise across coun-
tries. We provide a test of our explanation and ﬁnd support for our approach using
data on income taxes, taxes on property and expenditures on education.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years the question of how income inequality aﬀects economic activity in the
long run has received signiﬁcant attention from macro-economic researchers. At present
several theoretical models compete and complement each other in trying to explain how
the size distribution of income aﬀects economic growth.1 The present paper is preoccupied
with one such theory: The so-called ﬁscal policy approach.2
Oversimplifying, one may summarize the main theoretical predictions of the approach
as: (i) increasing skewness of the income distribution tends to increase redistributive
government intervention, and (ii) redistribution is detrimental to growth. Accordingly,
the reduced form prediction of the theoretical literature is that a more skewed distribution
of income is bad for long term growth.3
Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence seems to broadly support the reduced
form prediction of the ﬁscal policy approach (e.g. Clarke, 1995; Perotti, 1996a; Easterly
2001, 2002), the empirical success in terms of the speciﬁc mechanisms advocated has been
limited. In fact, a number of cross-country studies ﬁnd that if anything: (i) Countries
with a more skewed distribution seems to redistribute less (Perotti, 1996a; Lindert, 1996;
Bassett et al, 1999) and (ii) taxation/redistribution seem to be beneﬁcial to growth
(e.g. Perotti 1994, 1996a; Easterly and Rebello, 1993; Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Hence, the
conclusion seems to be that:
Although it [the ﬁscal policy approach] accounts for the negative correlation be-
tween inequality and growth found by reduced-form equations, the political econ-
omy approach is not fully supported by data ... redistribution is found to have
positive rather than negative inﬂuence on growth. Moreover, when measures of
redistribution such as tax rates or the extend of social spending are regressed on
1The seminal contribution is Galor and Zeira (1993). A review of the literature can be found in
Aghion et al (1999).
2A non-exhaustive list of theoretical contributions include: Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Bertola (1993);
Perotti (1993), and Persson and Tabellini (1994); Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993).
3The paper by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) contains a slightly diﬀerent prediction. In their model a
poor median voter will prefer more redistribution in the shape of expenditures on education. Since such
expenditure is shown to spur growth, an initially skewed distribution is predicted to enhance growth.measures of inequality, the coeﬃcient are either insigniﬁcant or have the sign op-
posite to what the theory would predict.
— Aghion et al, 1999, p. 1621.
The ﬁrst contribution of the present paper lies in developing a model capable of
reconciling the original theory with the above conﬂicting evidence. Speciﬁcally, we show
that under plausible assumptions, a negative income skewness/tax relationship, and a
positive tax/growth relationship may emerge in a cross-section of countries, while within
any one economy, a poorer middle class will lead to more taxation, and more taxation to
less growth. The second contribution lies in providing a test of our proposed explanation,
as detailed below.
The model developed below builds on the Alesina and Rodrik (1994) framework.
Hence, the formal structure allows for productive government investments (ﬁnanced by
wealth taxes) that aﬀect growth, and redistributes consumption.
The key diﬀerence to the Alesina and Rodrik analysis lies in the assumption that
fundamental (and slow-moving) structural characteristics — notably institutional quality
or key determinants thereof — matters both for the distribution of income, and to the level
of productivity. Speciﬁcally, we posit that countries equipped with a stronger institutional
framework tend to be more productive and feature a richer middle class. This is consistent
with the empirical work of Acemoglu et al (2001) and Easterly (2002). Acemoglu et al ﬁnd
that settler mortality rates in 19th century colonies are strongly related to institutional
"scores" as of the late 1990s. Instrumenting proxies of institutional quality by settler
mortality rates, they ﬁnd that the institutional framework has a strong causal impact on
productivity across ex-colonies. Easterly ﬁnd that settler mortality rates also predicts
income equality in the late 20th century: Low mortality tends to go hand in hand with
a richer middle class.
Formally the link between institutions, productivity and the income distribution is in-
troduced in a very simple way. First, stronger institutions is simply assumed to increase
the level of Harrod-neutral productivity.4 Second, since we are applying a standard
4Hall and Jones (1999) show that institutions have a strong causal eﬀect on not only GDP per worker
3neoclassical production function, changes in the level of productivity will aﬀect the dis-
tribution of factor income. In line with Alesina and Rodrik the main source of income
inequality in the model is heterogeneity with respect to factor endowments. Speciﬁcally,
wealth is unequally distributed, labor income is not. Given this assumption it follows that
the extent to which inequality of the distribution of wealth is translated into inequality
of income depends, in general, on the income shares of capital and labor, respectively. In
particular, we assume that countries with a stronger institutional environment are char-
acterized by a higher labor share, and therefore, have a more equal distribution of income,
ceteris paribus. The former link is consistent with Rodrik (1999). Using manufacturing
data for 93 countries he ﬁnd that labor’s share of value added is higher in countries with
democratic institutions. Moreover, Rodrik document that democratic institutions tend
to be accompanied by superior performance in terms of bureaucratic eﬃciency and rule
of law; standard measures of institutional quality.5
On this basis we present the following explanation for what one might term "the ﬁscal
policy puzzle". Within any given economy, increasing wealth inequality, and therefore,
holding fundamental structural characteristics ﬁxed, increasing income inequality, will
lead to more redistributive taxation. However, this relationship may break down as soon
as one consider economies that diﬀer with respect to the strength of institutions. The
reason is that a strong institutional framework implies that the marginal cost of public
investment (measured in terms of foregone future consumption) tend to be low, and
marginal beneﬁt high, since the level of productivity is "high". As a result, a majority
of the electorate may prefer a relatively higher level of government activity than what
holds for economies with a weaker institutional infrastructure. Since countries with strong
but also capital-output ratios, human capital stocks and, in particular, total factor productivity.
5Gollin (2002) recently compiled data on aggregate labor shares for a number of countries and cor-
rected them for the income of the self-employed. While he ﬁnds no systematic relationship between the
corrected shares and income per capita, there is a positive correlation between the adjusted labor share
(Column labeled "Adjustment 2" in table 2) and the institutional variable used by Hall and Jones (1999)
("GADP") . A lineare regression (covering 26 countries where data is available for both variables) yields
ac o e ﬃcient of .13 with a p-value of 0.06 (using robust standard errors). Hence Gollin’s work is not
necessarily at variance with our assumption of a positive relationsship between "institutions" and labor
shares. Needles to say, however, a more careful investigation involving more countries is called for in
order to provide a more deﬁnite test of our assumption (and Rodriks’ ﬁndings), at the aggregate level.
4institutions tend to be equal ones, the relationship between taxation and the middle class’
share may well be a positive one, but is generally ambiguous.
At the same time, the model can account for a positive correlation between growth
and taxes across countries. As in Barro (1990) the relationship between taxes and growth
exhibits the well-known hump-shaped form. However, the growth maximizing tax level
is shown to vary across countries. In particular, being higher in countries with stronger
institutions. Consequently, in a cross section of countries, it may appear as if taxation is
good for growth. But, as the analysis shows, this is solely a cross-sectional phenomenon.
Within any given economy, more taxation will lead to slower growth as the intensity of
government involvement moves further beyond the level at which growth is maximized.
This is a clear cut prediction since the tax chosen by the median voter always exceeds
the growth maximizing level, as in the Alesina and Rodrik model.
The empirical contribution of the paper lies in providing a test of this explanation.
Invoking panel data techniques, we attempt to disentangle the time-series variation in
income skewness, taxes and growth, from the pure cross-section variation. Using data
on income taxes and taxes on property we ﬁnd evidence in favor of the "traditional"
ﬁscal-policy approach when the time-series information is studied, whereas the puzzling
relationships mentioned above only emerges when we focus on the cross-country dimen-
sion of the data.
The paper falls in two main sections. After a brief review of related literature, Section
2 develops the model and discusses its implications for a cross-section of countries. Section
3 reports the empirical evidence. A ﬁnal Section 4 oﬀers brief concluding remarks.
1.1 Related literature
A number of possible explanations for the above mentioned puzzling evidence has been
suggested in recent years. Bénabou (1996), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996) and Lee and
Roemer (1998) all demonstrate how more inequality may lead to less redistribution when
there is a wealth bias in the political system. In the plausible case where income is
lognormal or Pareto distributed, and where the pivotal voter is richer than the person
5with median income, an increasing variance of the distribution may imply an increasing
income share for the pivotal (median) voter, ultimately yielding a negative, or U-shaped,
association between inequality and redistribution.
In the empirical work discussed above, however, the independent distribution variable
is typically not measures of dispersion (like the Gini-coeﬃcient), but rather measures of in-
come skewness.6 Since the before mentioned contributions all have a measure of dispersion
as their inequality variable, they are unable to explain why the middle class share appears
to exhibit a positive (/insigniﬁcant) correlation with measures of taxes/redistribution. In
contrast, the model developed below is able to account for this fact, but, at the same
time, warns that the cross-sectional result may not reﬂect a causal relationship.
In an extension of previous work, Benabou (2000) develop a model featuring multiple
steady states. Importantly, when comparing steady states the relationship between pre-
tax inequality and redistribution is a negative one; where inequality is measured by the
variance of a lognormal distribution. The stylized prediction of the model, then, is that
within countries the relationship between redistribution and inequality is ambiguous (un-
less the individual regimes can be identiﬁed), whereas the ﬁndings of e.g. Perotti (1996a)
arises across countries. Aside from the measurement issue of inequality, mentioned above,
the key diﬀerence to our framework is that the model below predicts the "standard" re-
lationship between income skewness and redistribution within countries: More skewness
raises redistributive eﬀorts.
Perotti (1996b) points to another reason why inequality and redistribution may be
related in the manner suggested by the cross-section evidence. In the standard model
redistribution is assumed to be directed towards the poor in a monotonic fashion. This
might not be the case empirically. Based on this observation Perotti suggests (informally)
that variations of beneﬁt shares across individuals might hold some explanatory power. If
redistribution predominantly beneﬁts the rich, then a poorer median voter might want less
redistribution. However, evidence from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS), presented
in Milanovic (2000), suggests that (at least in the countries covered) redistribution does
6For example, Perotti (1996a) uses the third quintile as a measure of the median voters income.
6in fact beneﬁt the poor. Indeed, net transfers appear to be more or less monotonically
decreasing as one moves across income deciles, starting with the poorest.
Yet another argument is put forward in Lee and Roemer (1999). In their analy-
sis credit markets are absent, and the population is (endogenously) segmented into a
group who invests and one who does not (the poorer individuals). Taxes are levied on
post-investment income. They proceed to demonstrate that if inequality increases, tax
revenues tend to decline because the share of the population who does not invest rises.
This "tax-base eﬀect" may ultimately be strong enough to produce a negative relationship
between income inequality (measured by the variance of a lognormal distribution) and
taxes, as the outcome of majority voting. In general their analysis suggest an inverted
U-shaped relation between taxes and inequality.
Somewhat relatedly Rodriguez (1999) questions the assumption of “tax compliance”.
In standard models it is assumed that everyone pay their taxes, which may not always
be the case. Rodriguez demonstrates that if the median voter recognizes the incentive,
on the part of the wealthy, to lobby for tax favors she might choose to lower taxes in the
face of increased inequality.
In terms of testable predictions the key diﬀerence between these theories, and the one
developed below, is the nature of the relationship between inequality and redistribution
when moving from cross-section to across-time data. All the existing explanations (except
Benabou, 2000) imply that the relationship between redistribution and inequality should
be the same across time and space whereas our model implies that the correlations may
change sign.
The relationship between taxes and growth may also be reversed, as pointed out by
e.g. Benabou (1996, 2000) and Aghion et al (1999), if credit markets are imperfect.
In this case redistribution may be good for growth as it grants borrowing constrained
(poor) individuals the ability to invest. Again, in contrast to our hypothesis, the work of
Benabou (1996, 2000) and Aghion et al (1999) suggests a uniformly positive relationship
between taxes/redistribution and growth when moving from the cross-country to across-
time dimension of the data.
7On the empirical side Milanovic (2000) recently found some corroborating evidence
in favor of the original political economy mechanism, using survey data from the LIS,
and, adopting a ﬁxed eﬀects approach: The income share of the "middle class" is sig-
niﬁcant in explaining the amount of redistribution accruing to this group. In terms of
the taxes/growth nexus a recent study by Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) reports a negative
impact of taxation on growth, using data spanning more than a century for the United
States and United Kingdom. Likewise, looking at a panel of OECD countries Kneller et
al (1999) ﬁnd a negative impact from taxes on growth.
Our empirical ﬁndings should be viewed as complementary to these results, as we
use diﬀerent data on "redistribution" and inequality. Moreover, our model provides a
theoretical explanation as to why results diﬀer so markedly between pure cross-section
regressions and panel data (/time series) regressions.
Finally, the contribution by Sylwester (2000) deserves special mentioning. Sylwester
examines both the relationship between inequality (measured by the Gini-coeﬃcient)
and redistribution (measured by expenditures on education as a fraction of GDP) and
the relationship between such expenditures and growth. Within a pure cross-section
regression analysis he ﬁnd: (i) more inequality in 1970 is associated with a higher level
of educational expenditures, and (ii) expenditures in the 1970s are negatively related
to growth from 1970-85, whereas expenditures in the 1960s are positively associated
with growth from 1970-85. Sylwester argues that the productivity enhancing eﬀects of
educational expenditures only manifests itself after a (long) lag, which is why expenditures
in the 60s raise growth in the 70s and 80s. The detrimental eﬀects of the expenditures in
t h e" c u r r e n t "p e r i o do ng r o w t hm i g h tb ee x p l a i n e db yt h el i k e l ya d v e r s ee ﬀects of higher
taxation required to ﬁnance government investments. In the empirical part of this paper
we revisit Sylwester’s ﬁndings. We suggest an alternative interpretation of his ﬁnding
and argue they are consistent with the explanation forwarded in the present paper.
82T h e M o d e l
Consider a closed economy with a constant population of measure one. The factor markets
are assumed to be competitive and the credit markets are perfect. Individuals are identical
with respect to preferences and productivity. We allow for heterogeneity with respect to
wealth. Taxes are levied on wealth; labor income is exempt from taxes. Each consumer
has a unit endowment of labor which is supplied inelastically. Furthermore, we assume a
balanced government budget at all times.
2.1 The Consumers









−ρtdt, ρ > 0, (1)
subject to the identity that accumulation of wealth ˙ ki (t) depends on labor income, w(t),
after-tax income from wealth [r(t) − τ]ki (t), and consumption
˙ ki (t)=w(t)+[ r(t) − τ]ki (t) − ci (t). (2)
The consumer’s problem of deciding on optimal consumption and saving is completed
with the No-Ponzi-Game condition, limt→∞ ki (t)e−rt ≥ 0. Standard computations lead
to the well known Keynes-Ramsey rule,
˙ ci (t)
ci (t)
= r(t) − τ − ρ ≡ γci, (3)
which states that the individual will prefer rising consumption if the after-tax real rate
of interest exceeds the rate of time preference. As all individuals face the same interest
and tax rate and are equally patient, equation (3) implies that γci equals the per capita
growth rate of consumption, γc. As is shown formally below, the real rate of interest is
constant at all points in time (r(t)=r). Hence, wealth, and thus capital, must also be
accumulated at the rate, γc.7
7If this were not the case, the savings rate would be either increasing or decreasing through time.
This would violate either the no-ponzi game condition or the transversality condition connected to the
92.2 The Firms






F (Kj (t),E(t)Lj). (4)
G(t) is productive government expenditure, K (t) is the aggregate capital stock, Kj (t)
and Lj is the input of physical capital and labor, respectively, while, E (t) is an index of
each workers productivity at time t. Both E (t) and G(t)/K (t) are treated as exogenous
by the producers. Note that
R
i Ljdj =1as total labor supply is of measure one. The
properties of g (·) and F (·) are discussed below.
The level of government intervention is divided by the aggregate capital stock so as
to capture congestion eﬀects. Hence, in order to increase over-all productivity, G(t)
has to rise in proportion to K (t) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). The function g (·)
determines the extent to which such an increase is transformed into an increase in (Hicks-
neutral) productivity. We assume g0 > 0,g 00 < 0 and the Inada condition limτ→0 g0 = ∞,
thereby allowing for diminishing returns to government productive investments. As we







E (t) expands as productive knowledge is accumulated in the process of capital accumu-
lation:
E(t)=AK(t), (5)
Equation (5) signify, that two countries (at a given point in time) with identical capi-
tal stocks, labor endowments, and government intervention, may diﬀer with respect to
the level of income per capita. The parameter A in equation (5) parameterizes such









ki(t) = γc ∀i,t.
10Turning to the functional form of the production function, F(·) summarizes how
combinations of physical capital and labor input are transformed into output. We assume
that F(·) exhibits constant returns in Kj (t) and Lj.
Given the production function, equation (4), the producers will acquire capital and








In symmetrical equilibrium, all producers choose the same factor intensity Kj/Lj. Using
this we may write the general equilibrium factor demand equations as
g (τ)(f (A) − Af
0 (A)) = r, (8)
g (τ)Af
0 (A)k(t)=w(t), (9)
where f (A) ≡ F (1,A), f0 > 0,f00 < 0.
2.3 Measuring Inequality






where k is the per capita stock of capital. Thus, σi denotes the (inverse) relative factor




ki(t) for all i.H e n c e ,t h e
distribution of wealth (capital) is time-invariant and predetermined.8
In the present framework, the distribution of wealth is paramount to the political
equilibrium. Typically, however, empirical investigations of the ﬁscal policy approach use
8Moreover, this might be a fairly reasonable property of the model from an empirical point of view. In
a study of the post world war II period, Li, Squire and Zou (1998) ﬁnd substantial variation in inequality
across countries, but little evidence of substantial long term trends in the size distribution of income
within countries. This does not mean, however, that changes in the distribution never occur (see e.g.,
Atkinson, 1997).
11measures of income, and not wealth, inequality. Hence, in order to make the theoret-
ical analysis comparable with these empirical studies we need to consider the mapping
from the wealth distribution to the (pre-tax) distribution of income, within the present
framework. Using the deﬁnition of before-tax household income, the deﬁnition of σi,a n d

















f(A) is labors share in total income while y (t) signiﬁes per capita (or mean)
















m (the wealth share of the person with median wealth) is reasonably assumed to
be less than one. In the remaining we make the following important assumption:
A1 Labors’ share in national income, w/y =
Af0(A)
f(A) ,i si n c r e a s i n gi nA.
Under A1 it follows that countries with stronger institutions, which works to increase
A, will tend to have a more equal distribution of income, ceteris paribus.9
2.4 The Economic Equilibrium
The model can be reduced to a simple AK-model:
y(t)=g (τ)f (A)k (t). (12)
A well-known property of this type of model is the lack of transitional dynamics. This
means that all endogenous variables grow at a common, constant rate. Consequently,
9Technically, A1 amounts to assuming an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor above 1.
Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000) estimate aggregate production functions for a large number of countries
and ﬁnd an elasticity of substitution, between physical and human capital, above unity. Still a straight
forward reparameterization of the model could allow us to obtain the same result (w/y increases in A),
while assuming an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor below 1.
12the Keynes-Ramsey rule, equation (3), pins down the over-all growth rate of (per capita)
income in the economy:
γ = g (τ)(f (A) − Af
0 (A)) − τ − ρ. (13)
If g (τ)(f (A) − Af0 (A)) − τ>ρ , the economy will grow at a constant positive rate.
Taxes have a dual impact on the growth rate, which leads to the familiar hump-shaped
relationship between taxes and per capita income growth: At low levels of taxation the
productive eﬀect dominates, which is why higher taxes tend to raise growth. But at
as u ﬃciently high level of capital taxation, τ∗, savings are reduced to an extent which
exactly oﬀ-sets the productive eﬀect. If a higher tax rate is implemented, growth will be










Notice that if A varies from country to country then τ∗ varies too. In particular we have
the following result
Proposition 1 The growth-maximizing tax rate, τ∗,i si n c r e a s i n gi nA.
Proof. Diﬀerentiation of equation (14) yields ∂τ∗/∂A =( Af00(A))/g00 (τ∗) > 0.
Thus, countries with stronger institutions reaches maximum growth at a higher level
of taxation. We now turn to the determination of the tax rate.
2.5 The Political Equilibrium
We assume that taxes are chosen through majority voting. Hence we follow the conven-
tional approach to determination of the political equilibrium within this line of literature,
the median voter theorem. To apply the median voter theorem, preferences must be sin-
gle peaked and the preferred tax rate must be monotonic across individuals, i.e., across
relative factor endowments. As a consequence of the balanced growth property of the
model, σi is constant, so we can abstract from issues of time inconsistency and strategic
voting when it comes to the political equilibrium.
13To solve for the preferred tax rate we need an expression for the path of consumption.








ki (t)=[ g (τ)Af
0 (A)σi + ρ]ki(t), (15)
where the last part of equation (15) follows from the equilibrium real wage, equation (9),
and the deﬁnition of σi, equation (10). Furthermore, since
˙ ki(t)
ki(t) = γ ∀i t h ee n t i r et i m e
path of consumption can be written as
ci (t)=[ g (τ)Af
0 (A)σi + ρ]ki (0)e
γt. (16)
Note that the level of consumption is increasing in τ through the real wage. At the
same time, however, the tax rate will have a negative eﬀect on (future) consumption
via reductions in the growth of consumption γ (insofar as τ>τ ∗,o fc o u r s e ) . I no t h e r
words, the consumer ultimately faces the problem of trading-oﬀ these two eﬀects against
e a c ho t h e r ,i . e . ,as t a t i cg a i nv e r s u sad y n a m i cl o s s . T h es o l u t i o nw i l ld e p e n do nt h e
individual’s relative factor endowment, σi, as will be clear momentarily.
The problem of individual i is to choose the tax rate which maximizes discounted
intertemporal utility. Insertion of the consumption path in equation (1), and integration




































∂τ is the marginal cost. It is apparent that all individuals face the same
marginal costs (MC) while MB varies. The ﬁrst order condition is illustrated in the
upper panel of Figure 1; the lower panel shows the relation between growth and taxes.
Marginal cost is zero if
∂γ
∂τ =0 , i.e., when the tax rate equals the growth maximizing
rate, τ∗. The MC-curve is upward sloping in τ>τ ∗ as the dynamic loss mentioned above
increases with the deviation from the growth-maximizing tax level.
14Figure 1: Determining the growth rate of the economy.
Next, consider the MB term. As g00 < 0 it follows from equation (18) that the MB-
curve will be downward sloping. Individual i’s preferred tax rate is uniquely determined
at the intersection of the two curves. As can be seen from equation (18), the MB-curve
shifts up if σi increases.
As for the actually implemented tax rate, it follows from the median voter theorem
that the chosen tax rate through majority voting should be the one preferred by the
median voter. Hence, the implemented tax rate reﬂects the median wealth share, σm,
assuming full participation at elections. In sum we have:
15Proposition 2 Redistribution, income skewness and growth within an econ-
omy.A s s u m eaﬁxed institutional framework, i.e. A constant. Then: (i) The chosen tax
rate is decreasing in the wealth (and income) share of the median voter; (ii) the chosen
tax rate is above the growth maximizing level; (iii) growth is decreasing in the degree of
wealth, or income, skewness.






diﬀerentiation show that the left hand side is increasing in σm - the inverse wealth share. Given
A is constant, equation (11) imply that a higher income share is associated with a lower level






The last equality is fulﬁlled by τ∗.O b s e r v e t h a t
σig0(τ)Af0(A)
ρ+σig(τ)Af0(A) is monotonically increasing in
σi. Hence for ∀σi > 0, the individually preferred tax rate τi >τ ∗. (iii) follows directly from
(i) and (ii).
Thus, increases in wealth inequality, and therefore income inequality (cf. equation
(11)), will lead to more taxation and less growth, as the selected tax rate moves further
beyond the growth maximizing level.
2.6 Cross-sectional Implications of the Model
In this section we examine the nature of the relationship between income inequality, taxes
a n dg r o w t hw h e nd i ﬀerent countries are compared, each of which being equipped with
diﬀerent levels of institutional quality, i.e. diﬀerent A’s. We start by noting that:
Lemma For σi given, stronger institutions (higher A), implies higher marginal beneﬁts





ρ+σig(τ)αL(A)f(A), where αL (A) ≡ f0 (A)A/f (A) is





ρ [g0 (τ)(f (A) − Af0 (A)) − 1]. Clearly ∂MC/∂A < 0 since f00 (A) < 0.
Consequently we have the following result:
16Proposition 3 Redistribution and income skewness in a cross-section of coun-
tries. All else equal, countries with stronger institutions (higher A)w i l l( i )c h o o s ea
higher level of taxation/redistribution and (ii) be more equal measured by income skew-
ness.
Proof. The ﬁrst part follow directly from the Lemma. The second part of the proposition
follows from A1 and equation (11) directly.
Hence, Proposition 3 show that if a (suﬃciently) large fraction of the cross-country
variation, in personal income inequality, is driven by variations in the institutional frame-
work of individual economies, then societies featuring a less skewed income distribution
may well be characterized by higher levels of taxation and redistribution. However, as
Proposition 2 demonstrates, this can occur even though "the world works" in accordance
with standard political economy growth models, associated with the ﬁscal policy approach
to income distribution and growth.
Figure 2 illustrates these results geometrically. Two economies are gathered in one
MC/MB diagram; they diﬀer solely with respect to A. For the purpose of illustration the
ﬁgure is drawn such that equilibrium MC(/ MB) are identical across the two countries.
This need not be the case in general however, as it depends on the relative size of the
shifts in the MB and MC-curves, brought forth by changes in A.
The lower panel illustrates how the variation in taxes get translated into variation in
growth rates. Proposition 1 says that in the society with strong institutions the growth
maximizing tax will be higher, as illustrated in Figure 2. As is clear from the ﬁgure;
when comparing the two economies growth- and tax rates, they may show up in (γ,τ)−
space as points A and B. Hence, the relative more equal society, featuring higher taxes,
will end up growing faster (point B). Again, this is solely a cross-section phenomenon.
Increasing the tax rate will unambiguously hamper growth within both economies.
It should be recognized that this analysis only illustrates the potential for these pat-
terns to arise in a cross-section of countries. Ultimately, other conﬁgurations are theoret-
ically feasible. For example, suppose the country with "bad" institutions also has a more
unequal distribution of wealth. Then the associated MB—curve (i.e. MBlow A,Unequal)
17Figure 2: A possible conﬁguration of income skewness, redistributive taxes and growth
in a cross-section.
will be placed further to the right than illustrated in Figure 2. This is due to the eﬀect
discussed in section 2.5; a poorer median voter will prefer more redistribution since MB
increases when the wealth share declines (cf. proposition 2, i). As a result, depending
o nt h es i z eo ft h ed i ﬀerence in wealth inequality between the two economies, the unequal
country may end up implementing a relatively higher tax level.
Likewise, the implied relationship between growth and taxes may be a negative one.
Indeed, in general we have
Proposition 4 Growth and taxes in a cross section of countries. Suppose in-
18dividual countries diﬀer solely with respect to institutional quality, i.e. A. Then the
cross-country relationship between equilibrium taxes and growth is ambiguous.
Proof. Changes in A will aﬀect γ both directly, and indirectly through the selected tax
rates. Total diﬀerentiate equation (13) :
dγ =( g
0 (τ)(f (A) − Af
0 (A)) − 1)dτ − g (τ)Af
00 (A)dA.




0 (τ)(f (A) − Af





The latter term is positive, but the ﬁrst term is negative. This follows from the ﬁrst order con-







ρ [g0(τ)(f (A) − Af0 (A)) − 1] > 0, implying that 1−g0 (τ)(f (A) − Af0 (A)) >
0 at an interior solution for taxes. Since proposition 3 establishes that ∂τ/∂A is positive, the
net eﬀect on growth will, in general, depend on the absolute size of ∂τ
∂A. If the indirect eﬀect
is small — either because ∂τ
∂A is "small" or because the economy is close to its τ∗ (implying
g0 (τ)(f (A) − Af0 (A)) ≈ 1)—t h e n
∂γ
∂A > 0. As a result, one should expect a positive rela-
tionship between the selected tax rate, and γ, when looking across countries that diﬀer with





¯ is suﬃciently large, the implied covariation between γ and τ
could be negative.
Nevertheless, the key insight gained from this analysis is that, ap r i o r i , the puzzling
cross-sectional relationships between income skewness, redistribution/taxes and growth
are fully reconcilable with an essentially standard political economy growth model fea-
turing majority voting over taxes.
Importantly, this purposed theoretical explanation can be confronted with data. Ac-
cording to the model, within any single country one should expect the "standard" interre-
lationships between income skewness, taxes and growth (Proposition 2). In a cross-section
of countries, on the other hand, one may observe a reversal of correlations (Propositions
3 and 4). These predictions clearly diﬀers from the results in the literature discussed in
Section 1.1. In these contributions the cross-sectional ﬁndings are given a causal inter-
pretation. Accordingly, the positive correlation between taxes and equality, and between
19taxes and growth, should arise within as well as across countries. This provides a case
for testing the model to which we now turn.
3 Regression Analysis
The empirical testing of the model falls in two main parts. First we use data on tax
revenues in OECD countries organized as a panel. Second we use data on expenditures
on education in a cross-section covering both high- and low- income countries.
3.1 Income Skewness, Taxes and Growth in OECD
The empirical analysis of inequality, taxes and growth is based on a panel of 19 OECD
countries over the period 1971-1995. Following standard practise in panel growth regres-
sions we aggregate the observations in the time dimension by averaging over ﬁve years.
Hence the panel is given as 19 countries and ﬁve time epochs (1971-75 to 1991-95).
The two individual causal relationships stressed by the literature are examined in turn.
First, the link between income skewness and redistribution ("the political mechanism"),
and then the link between taxes/redistribution and growth ("the economic mechanism").
In line with the theoretical model, the inequality variable is a measure of income
skewness. We use the average of the second and third cumulative quintiles as a measure
of the median income share. The quintiles are from the high quality panel compiled by
Deininger and Squire (1996).
With respect to the data for redistribution, Perotti (1996a:169) discuss the choice of
relevant ﬁscal variables to include in the model. In particular he selects a set of (average)
tax rates along with four expenditure measures from the functional classiﬁcation of public
expenditure. However, a broad country coverage of public expenditure limits the data
source to "Government Finance Statistics" (GFS) from the IMF. Unfortunately, GFS
concentrate on central government statistics, while the local government expenditure are
more diﬃcult to assess intertemporally. Since many expenditures are administered by
local governments in federal countries, cross country comparisons of central government
expenditure are problematic if the composition of local and central government expen-
20ditures changes over time.10 Consequently, we have chosen to limit ourselves to the use
of tax revenue statistics from OECD, which include both local and central government
revenue. Speciﬁcally, we have compiled a dataset encompassing two average taxes; taxes
on income, proﬁts, and capital gains (in brief: taxes on income) and taxes on property.
Both are measured as percentages of GDP.
Inspired by the speciﬁcation in Perotti (1996a) the political mechanism is analyzed by
regressing the two tax measures on the median income share and three additional control
variables. We include (log) GDP per capita to capture the notion of redistribution as a
luxury good (“Wagner’s law”), the dependency ratio to capture increased need for (tax
ﬁnanced) redistributive expenditures dictated by demographic changes (in ways of child
care, health care, social security and so forth), and ﬁnally the size of population (in
logs).11 The size of population is included so as to control for possible scale-eﬀects in
the provision of public goods.12 Hence, we expect the log of total population to have a
negative impact on the average tax rate.
As our measure of the median income share is a proxy, we apply the multiple indicator
solution, so that in the regressions below we instrument for the median income share using
the Gini coeﬃcient.13 Although the median income share and the Gini are functionally
related the relation is highly non-linear. Therefore we expect a very low correlation
between the measurement errors in the two proxies. The full list of instruments for the
median share of income is given in Table 1. The estimation procedure is single equation
two-step GMM.
The results for the political mechanism are given in Table 1. Regressions (1) and (2)
report the results of ‘typical’ political mechanism regressions: Redistributive measures,
10The much cited study by Easterly and Rebelo (1993) notes explicitly that their expenditure data
(which derives from GFS) suﬀe r sf r o mt h i sp r o b l e m .
11GDP per capita is from Penn World Tables, 5.6 with updates from the Global Development Network
Growth Database. The dependency ratio and size of population are both from the World Development
Indicators. Note that Perotti use the share of population over 65, rather than the dependency rate. We
found the dependency ratio to be the statistically preferred choice in our OECD sample.
12Sylwester (2000) uses population density, for the same reason, in his analysis of expenditures on
education. We return to this study below. He notes in passing, however, that the results are robust to
using the size of population in stead.
13See e.e., Wooldridge (2002).
21here taxes on income and property, are regressed on the controls and on the median
income share. As seen we obtain the by now standard result that an increase in the
median income share has a positive impact on taxes (as a percentage of GDP). This
m e a n st h a tl e s si n c o m es k e w n e s ss e e m st ob ea c c o m p a n i e db yh i g h e rt a x e s .
Table 1 about here
Now, in order to test the theoretical hypothesis developed above, there are at least
three diﬀerent strategies one could consider adopting.
The ﬁrst approach is "simply" to control for all the institutional factors (i.e. the
determinants of “A" in the theoretical model) that generate the cross-country correlations
stated in Proposition 3. While this is the most natural approach, it is also the least
useful. Imagine the above detected positive correlation between middle-class share and
taxation persists after rigorously controlling for institutional factors, using available proxy
variables. Should this result then be taken to imply that the theory of Section 2 is refuted,
or, that important determinants of "A" are still omitted from the regression?
The second and more promising approach is to “remove” the cross-country correlation
by some form of diﬀerencing, i.e., perform ﬁxed eﬀects regressions. Here, the problem
is that ﬁxed eﬀects regressions remove between 60 and 95 per cent of the variation in
the data.14 In addition, these ﬁxed eﬀects estimators require either strong exogeneity
assumptions or instrumental variables for (nearly) all regressors to avoid bias.15
As a result, we have chosen a third estimation strategy. According to the theory
developed above the observed relationship between income skewness and taxes should
be decomposable into two elements; one within country (across time) and another across
countries. While the time-series eﬀect can be given a causal interpretation (Proposition 2),
the cross-country correlation reﬂects the association between slow moving determinants
of income skewness (e.g. institutions) and the level of taxation (Proposition 3). Such
14Around sixty per cent of the variation in the growth rates is due to pure cross-country variation,
while more that 95 (90) per cent of the variation in taxes on income (property) is cross-country variation.
See the Appendix for further details.
15In light of these diﬃculties it is not surprising that none of the regressors are individually, statistically
signiﬁcant in ﬁxed eﬀects type versions of regressions (1) and (2).
22a decomposition can be achieved in the regression in the following way. The regression
model leading to regressions (1) and (2) in Table 1 takes the following form
yit = witα + βxit + εit,i =1 ,...,N, t=1 ,...,T, (19)
where yit is the tax variable, wit is the vector of control variables, xit is the median
share of income and subscript it indexes countries and time. A standard within-between
decomposition of the median share of income results in the following regression equation
yit = witα + β
b¯ xi. + β






Under Proposition 2 and 3 we expect to ﬁnd a negative β
w in the extended regression,
while β
b is positive.16 The decomposition in equation (20) is chosen because it is an
orthogonal transformation of the middle income share, i.e., the two regressors are un-
correlated by construction which makes a sharper interpretation of the results possible.
However, if the same transformation is used for the instrument — the Gini coeﬃcient —
strict exogeneity of the Gini would be required. To avoid the (clearly unreasonable) strict
exogeneity assumption, we apply a slightly diﬀerent decomposition to the Gini coeﬃcient:
Git = Gi1 +( Git − Gi1) (21)
Using the ﬁrst observation of the Gini for each country, Gi1,a n dt h ed i ﬀerence between
the Gini at time t and at time 1, (Git − Gi1), as instruments all that is required is
predeterminedness of the Gini coeﬃcient.
Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 1 show the political mechanism when we separate
the cross-country and the time series impact of the median share of income as explained
above. Consistent with the theoretical model the correlations in time and space are of
opposite sign: The correlation between the middle-class share and taxation is positive in
the cross-country dimension, while the time series (within country) eﬀect is signiﬁcantly
negative. This result obtains for both taxes on property and income.17 These "reversals
16If β
w turns out to be negative, then β
b must be positive; otherwise we would not get the over-all
positive correlation in regressions (1) and (2).
17We also experimented with adding measures of openness to trade as independent variable, inspired
by the work of Rodrik (1998), but found its inﬂuence to be insigniﬁcant in the present sample.
23of correlations" are hard to reconcile with preexisting rationalizations of the ﬁscal policy
puzzle (cf. Section 1.1).
Turning next to the economic mechanism, the two tax variables are included in growth
regressions as endogenous regressors. The instruments for taxes are given from the polit-
ical mechanism. In addition, however, we also use the Gini coeﬃcient as an instrument
for taxes. The control variables in the growth regression are initial GDP per capita, the
dependency ratio and the average years of secondary schooling in the population above
25 (from Barro and Lee, 1996).18
Table 2 about here
Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 2 report results for the economic mechanism using
the two taxes without any transformation. As seen we ﬁnd that taxes on income have no
signiﬁcant impact on growth while higher taxes on property seems to be associated with
higher growth rates according to regression (2).
Using the within-between transformation from equation (20) (of course, now “yit”
represents growth rates, and “xit” average tax rates) we ﬁnd in regressions (3) and (4) that
the cross-country impact is positive but insigniﬁcant (or borderline signiﬁcant for taxes
on income) while the impact within countries is signiﬁcantly negative. Accordingly, the
results indicate that changes in taxation have in fact lead to a de-acceleration of economic
growth in the OECD area during the 1970-95 period. At the same time a positive
cross-country correlation between taxes and growth is obtained. Under the theoretical
model this latter correlation can be interpreted as reﬂecting the relationsship between
fundamental determinants of "A", and long-run growth (cf. Proposition 4). Again,
most explanations of a positive "eﬀect" of taxation on growth would predict a uniform
correlation in the two dimensions of the data, whereas the model developed above suggests
that conﬂicting correlations could easily arise
18We have experimented with a number of other controls, in particular measures of institutions and
trade openness. However, none of the institutional variables nor openness were signiﬁcant. Note also
that controlling for the investment share in physical capital would not be sensible in the present context
as this is precisely the mechanism through which taxes are supposed to matter for growth.
24Overall, data seem to support the version of the ﬁscal policy approach presented in
Section 2, at least when we look at taxes on income and taxes on property.
Until now we have completely neglected the expenditure side of the government bud-
get. As mentioned above, the lack of comparable data on expenditures, encompassing
both local and central government outlays, precludes a full panel-data analysis. However,
the recent cross-sectional analysis of Sylwester (2000) uses data on expenditures on edu-
cation which does not suﬀer from this shortcoming. The next section revisits Sylwester’s
analysis and argues that it too is consistent with our theoretical explanation for the ﬁscal
policy puzzle.
3.2 Inequality, Expenditures on Education and Growth
As mentioned in the introduction, Sylwester (2000) analyze the relationship between
inequality, expenditures on education, and growth. The novelty of his work is that he
shows a positive impact from past expenditures on education on future growth alongside a
negative contemporaneous impact. The result is obtained using three-stage least squares
regressions for the political and the economic mechanisms.
More speciﬁcally, the dependent variable in the political mechanism is average ex-
penditures on education for the period 1970-85 in 54 countries, where the expenditure
data is from UNESCO. The controls are, apart from income inequality measured by Gini
coeﬃcients from Deininger and Squire (1996), the initial level of income, initial human
capital, a measure of democracy, initial population density, and average expenditures on
education in 1960-64 (see Sylwester (2000) for precise data deﬁnitions).
I nt h ee c o n o m i cm e c h a n i s mt h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ei st h ea v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t ei nr e a l
GDP per capita 1970-85, and the identifying restrictions are that population density,
democracy, and income inequality have no direct eﬀect on growth.
Table 3 about here
Regressions (1a) and (1b) in Table 3 report results which are identical to Table 2 in
Sylwester (2000).19 The impact of inequality on education expenditures is positive in
19We have rescaled expenditure on education and the average annual growth rate to be per cent.
25accordance with the ﬁscal policy approach. In the growth regression one ﬁnds a negative
impact from current expenditures while the lagged (1960-64) expenditures have a positive
impact. One perspective on these results is that they support the theoretical argument
forwarded by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993). Saint-Paul and Verdier argue that a ma-
jority of the electorate in unequal countries should opt for high levels of expenditures on
education, which redistribute income (from generation to generation), and spur growth.
But another interpretation also appears to be feasible.
We begin by observing that Sylwester’s growth regression can be expressed as
yi = wiα + β1xi + β0x
0
i + εi,i =1 ,...,N, (22)
where wi are the controls, xi is average expenditure on education in 1970-85 and x0
i
is average expenditure on education in 1960-64. Next, note that the equation can be
reformulated as
yi = wiα + β1(xi − x
0
i)+( β1 + β0)x
0
i + εi,i =1 ,...,N. (23)
This reparameterization shows that β1 could be interpreted as capturing the pure time
series relation between educational expenditure and growth, whereas the sum (β1 + β0)
measures the cross-country eﬀect. Likewise, in terms of the political mechanism (inequal-
ity vs. expenditures on education), the key result to note from regression (1a) is that the
coeﬃcient on education 1960-64 is close to one. In fact, one cannot reject the hypoth-
esis, that regression (1a) indicate a positive relation between inequality and changes in
educational expenditures.
These ideas are explored further in regressions (2a) and (2b) in Table 3 where the
above restrictions have been imposed explicitly. As seen, there is a signiﬁcant positive
impact of inequality on the change in expenditures and a negative impact on growth from
changes in these expenditures. This pattern is consistent with the theory developed in
Section 2.20
Unfortunately, we cannot test directly if our interpretation of the regression results is
“better” than the interpretation given in Sylwester. But it is possible to give an indication.
20We have also estimated the model using single equation methods (2SLS and GMM). The results are
not sensitive to such changes in estimation strategy.
26If the cross-country/time-series interpretation is to hold one should expect a change of sign
in the growth regression when the lagged expenditure on education is omitted from the
equation because the positive cross-country correlation is then only represented by current
expenditure. This change of sign is not expected in the past/present interpretation since
the negative impact of present expenditure should not be aﬀe c t e db yo m i s s i o no ft h e
positive "investment" eﬀect.21 Regressions (3a) and (3b) in Table 3 report the results for
the model when lagged expenditures are omitted from the growth equation. The eﬀect
on the coeﬃcient upon the contemporaneous expenditures is remarkable as it changes
into an insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect. Even though this is not a proper test it is consistent
with the cross-country/time-series interpretation of the results.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have suggested a theoretical explanation for the ﬁscal policy puzzle. The
theoretical model demonstrates how slow-moving structural characteristics (like institu-
tions) — which matter for both long-run productivity and the distribution of income —
could be responsible for the following puzzling cross-country regularities:
(i) A positive relationship between the income share of the middle-class and the amount
of redistribution/taxation;
(ii) A positive correlation between average tax rates and average growth rates.
At the same time, however, the model also predict that the relationships (i)a n d( ii)
may change radically when moving from pure cross-country to across-time observation of
economic systems. Speciﬁcally, within countries a reduction in the income share accruing
to the middle-class should be associated with increasing taxes; and this in turn with
slower growth in income per capita.
We have taken a ﬁrst pass at testing this possible reconciliation of the ﬁscal pol-
icy approach with the conﬂicting ﬁndings mentioned above. Essentially our estimation
21Needless to say, omitted variable bias invalidates a strict interpretation of the results.
27strategy consists of an attempt to discriminate between times series and cross country
variations in the data. While the former, under the theoretical model, can be given a
causal interpretation, the latter should not. The results are encouraging. Using data on
income and property taxes, and expenditures on education we do in fact detect the type
of "reversals of correlation" suggested by the model. In addition, our "within-country"
estimates are broadly consistent with the independent ﬁndings of Milanovic (2000), as
for the inequality/redistribution link, and Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) and Kneller et
al (1999), in terms of the tax/growth mechanism. Whether these results stand up in
more heterogeneous samples, encompassing non-OECD countries, is a question for future
work to resolve. Nevertheless, it seems fair to conclude that the ﬁscal policy approach
might still prove to be a viable theoretical account of why a skewed distribution of income
should hamper growth.
28AS u m m a r y s t a t i s t i c s











Summary statistics for the OECD sample
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max R-sq
hline Growth 2.207 1.788 -1.79 9.18 0.60
Tax on income 12.783 5.642 3.80 29.16 0.95
Tax on property 1.860 1.102 0.16 4.71 0.89
Median income share 27.399 3.632 15.95 33.84 0.81
Gini-coeﬃcient 34.166 5.681 23.30 54.98 0.84
Initial GDP per capita (log) 9.169 0.44 7.43 9.80 0.81
Dependency ratio 55.296 9.262 43.65 95.80 0.70
Population (log) 16.892 1.216 14.95 19.32 0.998
Secondary schooling 2.119 1.045 0.42 5.09 0.83
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33Table 1: The impact of the median income share on taxes
Dependent variable Tax on
income property income property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial GDP per capita (log) 7.81∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 9.22∗∗ 1.04∗∗
(5.66) (2.70) (6.40) (3.50)
Dependency ratio 0.04 −0.001 0.21∗∗ 0.06∗
(0.58) (0.09) (2.70) (1.86)
Population (log) −1.88∗∗ 0.58∗∗ −1.41∗∗ 0.62∗∗
(4.73) (7.31) (4.46) (5.50)
Median income share 0.35∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(2.52) (3.77)
Median income share, cross-country 0.86∗∗ 0.26∗∗
(3.29) (3.34)
Median income share, time series −1.16∗∗ −0.26∗∗
(2.28) (2.09)
Partial R2 in ﬁrst stage regressionsa
Median income share 0.73 0.73
Median income share, cross-country 0.53 0.53
Median income share, time series 0.27 0.27
Overidentiﬁcation test (p-value) 0.11 0.18 0.65 0.40
RMSE 3.51 0.96 4.35 1.13
Observations 71 71 71 71
Note: Two-step GMM-regressions of 19 countries over 5 periods. Instruments in (1) and (2):
The Gini coeﬃcient, initial GDP per capita squared andt i m ed u m m i e s . I n( 3 )a n d( 4 )t h eG i n i
coeﬃcent is replaced by ﬁrst period Gini and deviations from ﬁrst period Gini. * signiﬁcant at 10%;
** signiﬁcant at 5%. aThe partial R2 from the ﬁrst stage regressions takes the presence of several
endogenous variables into account. See Shea (1997) and Goodfrey (1999).
34Table 2: The impact of taxes on growth
Dependent variable Growth rate in real GDP per capita
Tax regressor income property income property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial GDP per capita (log) −3.97∗∗ −3.74∗∗ −3.66∗∗ −2.70∗∗
(5.50) (15.1) (5.21) (5.25)
Dependency ratio −0.08∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(4.06) (3.39) (4.04) (4.92)
Secondary schooling 0.32∗∗ 0.13 0.27∗ 0.46∗∗
(2.24) (0.57) (1.78) (1.99)
Tax regressor 0.07 0.92∗∗
(0.89) (2.15)
Tax regressor, cross-country 0.11 0.004
(1.63) (0.02)
Tax regressor, time series −0.47∗∗ −4.41∗∗
(2.31) (2.36)
Partial R2 in for ﬁrst stage regressionsa
Tax variable 0.26 0.13
Tax variable, between countries 0.34 0.21
Tax variable, within countries 0.27 0.12
Overidentiﬁcation test (p-value) 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.55
RMSE 1.43 1.54 1.45 2.21
Observations 78 78 78 78
Note: Two-step GMM-regressions of 19 countries over 5 periods. Instruments in (1) and (2): Initial
middle income share, the Gini coeﬃcient, initial GDP per capita squared, population (log), and
time dummies. In (3) and (4) the Gini coeﬃcent is replaced by ﬁrst period Gini and deviations
from ﬁrst period Gini. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%. aSee comments in Table 1.
35Table 3: Three-stage least squares results for expenditure on education and the growth
rate in GDP per capita 1970-85.
Dependent variable Education Average Change in Average Education Average
exp. growth edu. exp. growth exp. growth
Regression (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Income 0.52 0.12 0.49 0.60 0.54 −1.09
(2.27) (0.17) (2.16) (0.09) (2.32) (1.90)
Human capital −0.41 0.07 −0.44 0.11 −0.47 1.51
(1.44) (0.08) (1.57) (0.01) (1.63) (2.37)
Democracy −0.12 −0.11 −0.09
(2.06) (1.93) (1.24)
Population density −0.27 −0.27 −0.24
(3.32) (3.35) (2.75)
Income inequality 0.02 0.03 0.02
(2.08) (2.08) (1.23)
Education exp. 1960-64 0.89 2.26 0.64 0.94
(6.92) (3.60) (2.50) (7.24)
Education exp. 1970-85 −1.79 0.13
(2.91) (0.45)
Change in education exp. −1.78
(2.89)
hline RMSE 0.93 2.34 0.94 2.34 0.94 2.16
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
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